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Muslims in Harmony and Conflict in Plural Sri Lanka: 
An Historical Summary from a Religio-Economic and 
Political Perspective   
Ameer Ali, School of Management and Governance, Murdoch University, 
Western Australia  
Abstract: Islam and Muslims in Sri Lanka have a history of more than a 
millennium. During this long period their economic and religious experience 
had been one of fluctuating fortunes beginning with harmony and prosperity 
under Buddhist monarchs to repression and misery under Western colonialists. 
Economic freedom under native rulers, mercantilist restrictions under the 
Portuguese and Dutch and open economy under the British brought alternative 
episodes of economic affluence and depression to Muslims. After independence 
however, under a democratic polity the community adopted a pragmatic 
approach to the new situation which allowed Muslims and Islam to enjoy once 
again decades of peaceful coexistence and relative prosperity, until political 
and economic circumstances of the country changed dramatically to create an 
environment of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic phobia. What follows is a 
historical narration of these vicissitude retold from a religio-economic and 
political perspective.        
Introduction 
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka has a history of at least thirteen centuries. From a tiny 
group of adventurous merchants, travellers and pilgrims settled mainly along the western 
coasts of the island around the eighth century they have grown into a significant minority of 
one million and nine hundred thousand or little over nine per cent of the total population in 
2011 census.  Over this long stretch of history the community has experienced alternative 
periods of peaceful coexistence and protracted convulsions caused by factors from within 
and outside Sri Lanka. The community’s religious and economic fortunes have fluctuated 
accordingly. This essay summarises the different facets of this fluctuation from the earliest 
days of Muslim arrival when they were accepted by the hosts as an invaluable resource to a 
socially stratified and semi-open economy, to the present day, when they are, in the view of 
ultra-nationalists, looked down upon as aliens, fanatics and parasites in an open economy. It 
is a story of swinging fortunes of an enterprising people retold from the perspective of 
political economy.    
2 
 
Arrival and Settlement 
Even though the Arabs and Persians were frequenting the shores of Serendib (Sri Lanka as 
known to ancient Arabs) for trading purposes long before Islam was born in the seventh 
century, as Muslims their arrival is dated back to a century later1 and by that time the island 
was the home of three ethnic groups, Sinhalese, the majority of whom were Buddhists, 
Tamils who were overwhelmingly Hindu by faith, and indigenous Veddas who were 
animistic in religious belief.  By the eighth century therefore, Sri Lanka was already a plural 
society. It was not only plural in social and cultural make up but also was open in economic 
design. Although Hindu caste restrictions determined an individual’s choice of economic 
vocation there were no state imposed restrictions to trade either domestically or externally. 
Trade, like now was then also a “lucrative profession”2.However, being a fundamentally 
agrarian economy with a culture that did not provide pride of place to merchants and 
traders commercial skills especially in the area of overseas trade were at an underdeveloped 
stage in medieval Sri Lanka. A resource rich country was handicapped by the relative 
absence of an indigenous merchant class to maximize its economic potential. The advent of 
MusIim merchants and their settlements along the coastal districts went a long way in 
bridging this lacuna.  
It was through these merchants that spices, timber, elephants, pearls and precious stones of 
the island found their way to the Middle East and from there to Europe. In the thirteenth 
century for example, King Bhuvanekabahu I sought an agreement with the Sultan of Egypt 
“to supply him with cinnamon, precious stones, and elephants”3.  In order to maintain a 
long term diplomatic and trade link with Muslim Middle East local kings had gone to 
extraordinary length to ingratiate themselves with the ruling caliphs and sultans. For 
example, according to one Arabic source, Futuh al-Buldan by the historian Al-Baladhuri 
(d.892), when Iraq was under the Umayyad Governorship of Hajjaj ibn Yusuf the king of 
Jeziratul Yaqut or Island of Rubies, as the island was sometimes named by the Arabs 
“because of the beauty of the faces of its women”, repatriated the orphaned daughters of 
some Muslim merchants who died in the island. (Whether these daughters were born to 
Arab wives and accompanied their fathers or born to wives that these merchants married in 
Sri Lanka is not known.)  The vessels that carried this human cargo were captured by some 
Indian pirates near present day Karachi which triggered an Arab invasion of India in 710-
7124. Thus, in their desire for closer commercial links with the rising Muslim empire the 
rulers of Sri Lanka were more than accommodative to the immigrant Muslim traders. 
With Muslims came the religion of Islam and the Qur’an followed not the flag but the 
weights and measures of traders. The new faith that was hardly two hundred years old and 
which captured the hearts and minds of a vast majority of Arabs and North Africans, was a 
religion that promoted trade as a noble profession and in course of time trade became 
Islam’s most representative profession. As long as the Arabs ruled over the sea lanes Arabic 
as a consequence became the lingua franca of international traders. It was the Muslim 
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traders more than Muslim soldiers who were the chief propagators of Islam at least in most 
parts of Asia and Africa. Medieval Sri Lanka was a classic example of this development. Once 
the local rulers decided to welcome the Muslim merchants and allowed them to settle in 
the country they could not prevent Islam from being practised. As long as it did not hurt the 
“religious susceptibilities of the majority of the people among whom they lived”5 Islam, 
according to Paranavitana, was permitted to exist.  
By the tenth century however, Islam had begun to win converts in Sri Lanka and there arose 
a need for teachers to impart religious knowledge to the new entrants. A gravestone 
discovered in Colombo originally by a Dutch official in 1787 and said to have been 
rediscovered in 1827 by the then Chief Justice Alexander Johnston6 bears an Arabic 
inscription in Kufic script which talks about a religious teacher by the name of Khalid Ibn Abu 
Bakaya who was dispatched by the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad around the year 940 AD to 
instruct the Muslims in Colombo on Islamic beliefs.  Bakaya died in Colombo in 948 AD7.  
“After his death the Caliph of Baghdad sent some learned persons to Colombo for the 
express purpose of engraving an inscription on his tombstone.”8 Following the arrival of 
‘learned persons’ mosque constructions must also have begun around Colombo. Buddhist 
compassion and economic interests coalesced to convince the rulers that accommodating 
the Muslims as permanent residents and their religion an additional faith in the kingdom 
would be of long term benefit.  That conviction must have been one of the reasons why 
some monarchs went to the extent of not only allowing Muslim merchants to settle their 
trade disputes in accordance with their own laws in front of Muslim priests9 but also to  
admit a few leading members of the Muslim community into the royal court.  Citing the 
twelfth century Arab geographer and cartographer Muhammad Al-Idrisi (1099-1165) 
Dewarajah shows that in a sixteen-member royal council there were four Muslims, four 
Christians and four Jews10.  Also, in the in the fourteenth century when Ibn Battuta (1304-
1368/9) the Moroccan traveller from Tangiers went to the court of the Tamil King Arya 
Chakravarti the latter demonstrated his ability to understanding some Persian, which makes 
one wonder how intimate would have been the contacts between Muslim merchants and 
royalty11.      
Winning the favour of monarchs and gaining access to royal courts however, did not 
automatically translate into capturing the hearts and minds of the subjects.  Writing in the 
nineteenth century, James Emerson Tennent, a brilliant British civil servant, observed that 
the “southern Singhalese” refused to have any intercourse with strangers and more so with 
those who were not of their religion12.  This means that the nascent Muslim community 
must have lived almost in coastal enclaves as parallel societies. For a merchant community 
such exclusion from the main stream might not have mattered had the community’s 
commercial interests were to confine only to wholesale and foreign trade, but more profit 
could be earned by engaging in retail trade also. Entry to the retail sector would be difficult 
without direct contact with domestic customers. The Muslim merchants had to become 
acceptable to the Buddhist and Hindu masses rather than to the ruling elite only.  Positive 
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developments towards that direction began when a new group of Muslims arrived after the 
tenth century. These visitors were not necessarily traders but wandering sufis or Muslim 
mystics whose interests were not in material acquisition but in heavenly rewards earned 
through love and remembrance of Allah, the Creator. 
 Saint worship is a core element of sufism. According to Ibn Al-Arabi (1165-1240), the most 
venerated sufi of Andalus in Spain, all prophets including Adam were saints and the saints 
“by ascesis and … possession of inner knowledge (ma’rifa) could attain to the position of 
being mirrors in which the Light of God was reflected”13. The religious legend surrounding 
the footprints on top of the Adams Peak or Samanalakanda (butter-fly-mountain) in the 
Ratnapura District thus became a focal point of attraction and drew a host of Muslim sufis, 
pilgrims and travellers from the tenth century onwards. In Muslim tradition Allah cast Adam 
and Eve from paradise and when they tumbled to earth the man landed on the peak of the 
mountain, leaving an impress of his foot in the solid rock. The earliest reference to a visit by 
a sufi to the island is found in the Rehla or travels of Ibn Batuta who mentions the name of a 
Shykh Abdulla Ibn Khafifi (d. 983 AD) from Iran14. Local traditions refer to a number of such 
visitors. The famous shrine of Daftar Jailani near Balangoda in the Ratnapura District is said 
to be the spot where Muhiyuddin Abdul Qadir Jilani (1077/8-1166) of Baghdad, a sufi and 
head of the Qadiriya sect, had meditated for over a decade15.  Later in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries Sayyid Jalaluddin Bukhari (1199-1291) of the Suhrawardiyya sufi order 
and Ali Hamadhani (1314-1384) of Kubrawiyya order, were said to have wandered through 
the island16.  
The impact that these mystics had on the spiritual landscape of Sri Lanka at that time cannot 
be underestimated. Although Islam had fundamental theological differences with Buddhism 
the attitudes, outward appearance, and the overall charisma of a sufi had several similarities 
with those of a Buddhist monk. For example, a Buddhist monk renounces the worldly life 
and aspires to attain nirvana or salvation. Likewise to a sufi’s renunciation of this world is 
the first stage of his zuhd (asceticism) or fana (destruction of ego), though salvation to him 
is not a state of nirvana but direct communication with the Haqq (Reality). To the monk 
poverty is a fact. He owns but three robes, a waist cloth, a cowl, a razor, a water-strainer 
and a needle. To this list may be added a parasol, a pair of sandals, few books and for the 
writer, his desk equipment. He fasts, practices celibacy, meditates and lives in a 
monastery17.  To a sufi also outward poverty is a necessary station in his path to Reality and 
the coarse mat on which the mystic slept often constituted his only worldly possession, 
though the khirqa (the patched garment) he wore and the tasbih (rosary) he carried could 
be two additions to his possessions. Like a monk a sufi also fasted, some even practiced 
celibacy, meditated and lived in their khanqahs or zawiyas (sufi centres).18 Buddhist monks 
in the villages also often functioned as healers of diseases and chastisers of the devil, in 
which respect the sufis also carried a similar image. The amulets, the charmed water and 
the oil which the sufis distributed to the sick and their meditations on behalf of sufferers 
were believed to carry healing properties and comforting powers. Above all, a sufi is “by 
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nature tolerant, seeing as he does, truth in all religions, which for him, appears as the 
outward manifestations only of a single and essentially inexpressible truth.”19 All this implies 
that in the eyes of the ordinary Buddhists the sufis appeared as peaceful and charismatic 
personalities who like their own priests had renounced the world and were wandering 
through the country in search of the ‘Reality’. It was in this manner that the sufis won 
respectability that spilled over into creating a positive image of the Muslim community as a 
whole and paved the way for the penetration of Muslim traders into the interior and 
capture the retail sector of Sri Lanka’s economy. 
The cordiality extended towards Muslim merchants by the kings and the initial reluctance 
but delayed acceptance of the new arrivals by the ordinary folk meant not only the opening 
of doors to further immigration from the Middle Eastern quarter but also opportunity for 
other Muslims, notably from neighbouring India, to enter Sri Lanka. The rising influence of 
Muslims in the Vijayanagara Empire of South India in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
as a consequence the passing of the Hindu share of Indo-Ceylon trade into Muslim hands, 
and the friendly relations that the King of Jaffna, Arya Chakrravarti, cultivated with the 
Muslim rulers of Madurai, all resulted in the arrival and settlement of Tamil and Malayalam 
speaking Muslims in the north of the country20. It was during this period that the Sri Lankan 
Muslim community underwent an ethnic transformation.  K. M. de Silva, the foremost 
historian of the country records that “as a result of intermarriage between them and the 
local population, they became Indo-Arab in ‘ethnic’ character rather than purely Arab.”21 
And, in course of time in the words of another leading historian, Lorna Dewaraja, “… a group 
of itinerant traders, initially foreign in race, religion and culture became an indispensable 
and integral part of the Sri Lankan society.”22 Thus, from the time of their arrival until the 
advent of the Portuguese in 1505 the Muslims in Sri Lanka were living prosperously and in 
unparalleled harmony in an atmosphere of socio-cultural pluralism and open economy. In 
that harmonious environment the size of the community also increased which made 
Tennent in the middle of nineteenth century to hypothesise in reverse that “but for this 
timely appearance of a Christian power in the island, Ceylon, instead of being a possession 
of the British Crown, might at the present day have been a Mohamedan kingdom under the 
rule of some Arabian adventurer.”23 Writing in the second half of the twentieth century G. 
C. Mendis, a local historian, also shared to a lesser extent the same view.24          
Mercantilism and Muslim Misery  
From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries mercantilism reigned supreme over 
European economic domain. Conquest and colonization with trade monopolies and 
discriminatory economic regimes promised prosperity to the conquerors and misery to the 
conquered. In Sri Lanka European mercantilism colluded with religious bigotry to spell 
disaster to a thriving Muslim community.  The conquest of the island’s maritime districts by 
the Portuguese in the sixteenth century and by the Dutch in the seventeenth severely 
disrupted if nor totally removed many a lucrative trading opportunities of the Muslims. To 
6 
 
the Portuguese, as their historian Fernao De Queyroz titled his book, the conquest of Sri 
Lanka was a “temporal and spiritual” venture25. Their attitude towards the Muslims was well 
captured by Lopo Soarez de Albergaria, the Governor of Portuguese India, when he 
addressed the soldiers before they set sail to Sri Lanka in 1516. “I quite understand”, he 
said, “the pain our arrival will give to the Moors; but as the sword which you see in my hand 
is one which I have often seen stained with their blood, I do not consider it a novelty to soak 
in Mohametan blood the sword which I vow to die, since our conquests in general are more 
against them than against the heathen, who are excused by their ignorance, while the 
Moors are condemned by their malice.”26 The butchery of Muslims in Matara along the 
southern coast in 1643, the burning of mosques in Colombo, and the expulsion of around 
four thousands of Muslims from the Portuguese territory meant a period of fear and 
insecurity to the followers of Islam.  Even though the personal greed of Portuguese officials 
and general administrative corruption created some avenues for a sagacious Muslim trader 
to make risky profits27 the overall political and economic situation in the occupied territories 
proved to be too hazardous for Muslims to survive in tranquillity. 
The Portuguese rule however, resulted in another historic development as far as ethnicity 
and religiosity of Muslims were concerned. Ethnically, the Muslim community which was 
Arab28 to start with was transformed into Indo-Arab by the end of the fifteenth century 
owing to the influx of an Indian element, and after the sixteenth century it once again 
changed its ethnicity to Moor, thanks to the Portuguese who bestowed this Latin derived 
epithet “indiscriminately upon the Arabs and their descendants, whom on the sixteenth 
century, they found established as traders in every port on the Asian and African coast”29. 
Religiously, the Portuguese mastery over the Indian Ocean cut off a vital link with Arabia by 
making it extremely difficult if not impossible not only for any Islamic religious scholar or 
mystic to come to Sri Lanka from that quarter but also for any Muslim from Sri Lanka to 
undertake the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca. Considering the role that this fifth pillar of 
Islam played in seventeenth century Indonesia enabling those Muslims to withstand the 
state backed missionary onslaught of Christianity, its disruption in Sri Lanka in the sixteenth 
century meant a heavy blow to the spiritual nourishment of local Muslims.  Being cut off 
from the Middle East and also from neighbouring sub-continent which supplied religious 
teachers and functionaries Islam in the Portuguese territories was isolated from the Muslim 
world and faced an alarming existential threat. While official encouragement of 
incendiarism destroyed the mosques and made prayers in congregation difficult for Muslims 
naval restrictions imposed on Hajj pilgrimage jeopardised any chance of spiritual 
replenishment from outside. It is against this twin set of adversities that one should see the 
genesis of a “Ceylon Moor” community as distinct from its religious counterpart either in 
Arabia or India.  In short, the Portuguese became the unwitting fathers of a “Ceylon Moor” 
ethnic identity30.         
The change of rule from Portuguese to Dutch did not bring any relief to Muslim misery. 
According to Van Sanden, a writer of Dutch descent, the new regime opened “one of the 
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darkest chapters in the history of the Ceylon Moors”31.  The Dutch policy was “to restrict 
both the economic power and the religious propaganda of the Muslims in an effort to see to 
it that they … (did) not expand beyond their existing confines and convert more Sinhalese to 
their faith”32. Accordingly, Governor Rycloff Van Goens instructed the administration officer 
in Matara that he “must not permit the Moors to perform any religious rites, nor tolerate 
their priests either within or outside the gravets. He must guard against their entering the 
country from the outside, and deliver up for punishment anyone who should be caught 
doing so contrary to orders, with a view to setting an example to others.”33 More 
instructions were issued to the Dissava of Jaffnapatam to the effect that all “Muhammadan 
superstitions must be rooted out in this country as far as possible”34, and hence “the Moor 
and Muhammadan subjects of the company receive less favour than the Christians and 
heathens.”35 In short, the Dutch administration desired “to gradually exterminate this 
impudent class of people”36, and with them their religion.  
However, in the matter of Muslim religious laws there was a positive change during the 
latter half of the Dutch rule which enabled the Muslim community to establish a Muslim 
court of justice that must have been abolished by the Portuguese; because Governor Iman 
Willem Falk (1765-1785) found there were no persons qualified in the in Muslim laws in the 
island. He therefore reported the Matter to Batavia and became instrumental in drafting a 
short code of Muslim laws by the best informed and most learned of the Muslim priests 
within the Dutch territory37. This code was later declared “to be perfectly applicable” and 
was “ordered … to be considered law by all the Dutch courts of justice”38. In addition to the 
code of laws the Dutch also appointed Muslims as headmen to administer Muslim affairs, 
and even employed Muslims as valuers of gems and other articles of commerce. All this 
suggests that there was a considerable change of attitude towards Muslims between the 
beginning and end of the Dutch regime. Despite this change the Muslims under the Dutch 
did not regain the freedom and prosperity that they enjoyed before the arrival of the 
Portuguese. Mercantilist restrictions and religious discrimination compelled at least a 
section of the Muslims to seek an escape route. Once again it was the Buddhist monarchs 
who came to their rescue.   
Indigenization of Moors 
The oppression and eventual expulsion of Muslims from the Portuguese territories led many 
of the victims to move into the interior of the country and seek refuge in the independent 
Kandyan Kingdom. King Senerath (1604-1635), a Buddhist monarch accommodated the 
Muslim refugees and settled them along the eastern coasts of Kottiyar and Batticaloa. Even 
under the Dutch administration waves of Muslims migrated to the Kandyan territory in 
search of a better life. This exodus marked the beginning of a process of indigenization of 
Muslims in Sri Lanka. Those Muslims who remained in the Dutch territories and those who 
migrated to the interior realised that they had to diversify their skills into other occupations 
in line with the mainstream Sinhalese and Tamils. In the socially stratified feudal Kandyan 
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Kingdom, it was the happy combination of Buddhist compassion, strategic needs of the state 
and above all an acute demand for additional manpower to increase economic output and 
productivity that created a win-win situation for the ruling regime and Muslims. While the 
permanent presence of a Muslim community became an economic and strategic advantage 
to the Kandyan state the protection the monarch accorded to Muslims promised the latter 
peace, security and prosperity.   
From being a specialised community of merchants and traders living in parallel societies the 
Muslim community after the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was increasingly 
becoming indigenized and integrated if not assimilated. They diversified their skills and 
spread into various other occupations such as paddy cultivation, fishing, transport, weaving, 
tailoring, hair dressing, dairy farming and even providing services to Buddhist temples39.  An 
important aspect of this indigenization and integration was the “considerable syncretism in 
religious practice and a significant degree of ‘ethnic’ boundary-crossing”40. Dewaraja’s 
observation regarding the Muslims in this regard is worth noting: “From a trading  
community with tenuous affiliations to the host culture, they developed paradoxically into a 
group which while remaining devoutly Islamic, had a place in the most intimate and 
innermost recesses of Kandyan life; in the administration of the Dalada Maligava which 
enshrined the palladium of Buddhist royalty; in the pomp and ceremony of the viharas and 
devales and in the day to day functioning of the monasteries which were the hub of the 
spiritual and cultural life of the village.”41 Whether the Muslims “remained devoutly Islamic” 
in spite of the developments she describes is debatable. Yet, her claim that this display of 
Buddhist and Muslim inter-social and inter-cultural accommodation was “unique” cannot be 
disputed. That accommodation found its place in state administration also. Muslims were 
enlisted as royal security guards and into the local army; their leaders were admitted to the 
state bureaucracy and became even diplomatic envoys; their mendicants were granted 
special privileges, if Robert Knox, the British captive in Kandy for nineteen years, is to be 
believed, to demand “a Ponnam” from “every Free-holder… (a)nd if the house be shut … to 
break it open, and to take out of goods to the value of it.”42        
It was this parallel process of indigenization of the Muslims on the one hand and 
inclusiveness of the Kandyan feudal regime on the other in combination with the 
occupational diversification of Muslims that led at the end to the ubiquity of Muslim 
settlements. Today the Muslims are present in every province and in every district of the 
country, the political implications of which will be discussed later in this narrative.  In short, 
the migration of Muslims from the coastal to the interior regions of Sri Lanka after the 
sixteenth century allowed them to continue the harmony and prosperity they enjoyed 
before it was violently disrupted by the Portuguese and Dutch intrusion. 
Muslims under the British 
The arrival of the British in 1796 and the subjugation of the entire country in 1815 under 
British rule marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka. An 
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open market economy built on the edifice of an export-dependent plantation industry not 
only welcomed unrestricted inflow of foreign capital, foreign labour, and foreign 
entrepreneurship but also provided opportunities to the rise and growth of a local petty 
bourgeoisie which included a significant Muslim element. Three notable developments that 
emerged during this period played a deterministic role in shaping the future of the Muslim 
community. Firstly, the official image of the Moors underwent a radical change from 
negative to positive under the British. To the crusader Portuguese and mercantilist Dutch 
the Moors represented both an infidel and interloper combined. In their view therefore, the 
Moors had to be eliminated totally and if that was not possible at least their movements 
and activities had to be circumscribed strictly. In contrast, the British found in the Moors a 
community of enterprising, active, hardworking, dynamic, and business minded people who 
were in the British view the polar opposite of the slovenly, indolent and unenterprising 
majority Sinhalese43. The Moors were therefore viewed with favour as a class of beneficial 
economic functionaries in an emerging commercial economy. For instance, long before the 
development of roads and railways in the nineteenth century it was the Muslim pedlars and 
tavalam or bullocks-driven caravan traders who were ubiquitously present and who 
functioned as the irreplaceable middlemen between the village suppliers and their 
consumer counterparts. These middlemen functionaries continued with their middlemen 
services even after the advent of modern roads and railways. The only difference then and 
now was that instead of being travelling salesmen they became settled shop-keepers 
permanently residing in their own town and village business premises. While trade and 
commerce once again became the most preferred profession of the Muslims it also earned 
the entire Muslim community the popular sobriquet, ‘business community’.        
The second development was the increasing influx of Indian Muslims into Sri Lanka from the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Officially dubbed as ‘Indian Moors’ these Muslims were 
‘birds of passage’ whose chief motive was to earn as much profit and wealth as possible 
before departing to their own country. Without any commitment toward the native 
population the Shylockian methods of Indian Moor business competition not only created 
resentment amongst impoverished local villagers but also was frowned upon by their Sri 
Lankan Moor brethren because the Indians took away many businesses that were 
traditionally dominated by the latter. The Indian Moors became the main target of attack 
when first recorded Sinhalese-Muslim racial riots broke out in Sri Lanka in 191544. The 
grudge that the local Moors had against their Indian brethren was eloquently expressed 
several decades later in 1948 when Razik Fareed, a then member of the Senate, spoke, “we, 
the Ceylon Moors have suffered most in the past for want of a Citizenship Bill. We … have 
been treated very badly by certain people, under the guise of Muslim brotherhood. We 
have, very unfortunately, played ourselves into the hands of other people.”45 What is 
notable here is the fact that while the name Moor which was a disparaging epithet 
bestowed by the Portuguese has now been embraced with pride as the sole ethnic identity 
of local Muslims. Razik’s passionate insistence in separating the Ceylon Moor identity from 
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the Indian half showed his total compliance with the British colonial categorization of the 
two groups. 
The third development was the Indianization of Islam in Sri Lanka a phenomenon resulted 
since the Portuguese domination over the Indian Ocean after the fifteenth century. As 
noted earlier, Islam originally came to Sri Lanka along with the Arabs from the Middle East. 
However, as the number of Arab and Persian traders and pilgrims frequenting the island 
declined it was the Muslim sufis and imams from India and especially from South India 
which replenished the drying Arab-Persian Islamic channel. The Islam that came through the 
Indian channel was mostly ritualistic and syncretic adulterated by the religious and cultural 
environment of South-India. Even sufism in South India was influenced by the Hidu Bakti 
movement46. Of the sufis who came from the subcontinent the famous Nagore saint Sheikh 
Hamid Nagore Meeran Saibo (1532-1600) is said to have accompanied Seyyad Shihabuddin 
Oliyullah and whereas the former returned to his motherland the latter is said to have died 
in the island and the Meeramakkam mosque at Kandy in the central hills is believed to have 
been built on his burial spot47. In the nineteenth century the South Indian Muslim 
merchants who came to Sri Lanka were accompanied by Tamil and Malayalam speaking 
imams, religious teachers and sufis. These merchants built several mosques and religious 
schools all over the island and numerous students who graduated from these schools later 
went to the famous madrasa in Vellore, Baqiyat al-Salihat for advanced religious studies. 
Islamic religious knowledge flowed not directly through the Arabic channel, which the local 
Muslims except a very few could not understand at all, but through an Arabic transliterated 
Tamil channel named Arabic-Tamil. In short, after the fifteenth century and right until the 
1970s it was India and not the Middle East that that predominantly influenced the religious 
beliefs and practices of Sri Lankan Muslims. However, with an officially endorsed positive 
image, with greater economic freedom, and with a South-Indian variety of syncretic Islam 
the Muslim community in Sri Lanka grew in number (228,000 or 5.6% of total population in 
1901) and lived as a protected business community although in cultural isolation with an 
acquired Moor ethnic identity.  This harmony received an adverse shock in in 1915.  
The last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a Buddhist revivalist 
movement as a precursor “to the growth of national consciousness and the recovery of 
national pride.”48 This revivalism which initially took an anti-Christian stance eventually, 
with the support of a rising Sinhalese petty bourgeoisie, developed into a xenophobic 
movement and targeted the Indian Moor businessmen who were present not only in the 
urban areas but also in the villages of the interior. The ritualistic and fundamentalist Islam 
the Indians propagated provoked an incident in 1915 where in the town of Gampola in the 
Central Province a traditional Buddhist procession accompanied by drums and music was 
prevented from passing in front of a mosque. This incident added to the simmering 
economic grievances and triggered the anti-Muslim riots of that year in which the Muslim 
community suffered considerable losses in property and life49. With this episode more than 
a millennium of peaceful coexistence between the Sinhalese and Muslims came to an end.   
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Politics of Pragmatism 
If there was any lesson that the 1915 riots taught the Sri Lankan Muslim community it was 
the unassailable fact that in an independent Sri Lanka  the future of Muslim survival and 
harmonious existence depended not in opposing but in aligning with the Sinhalese elite.  
This became the metanarrative underlying what came to be described as politics of 
pragmatism of the Muslim community after 1948. The growth of divisive ethnic politics from 
the nineteen-fifties opened ample opportunities for Muslim leaders to translate in practical 
terms the efficacy of this narrative. The ethnic rivalry between the two major communities - 
the Sinhalese and the Tamils - political divisions within the majority Sinhalese, and the 
electoral ubiquity of Muslim voters supplied the means to achieve that end. 
The Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic chasm that continued to widen from the 1950s leading 
eventually to a twenty-five year civil war that ended only after the military defeat of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 made Muslim support crucial to Sinhalese 
dominated governments in Colombo. From the point of view of the government winning the 
support of local Muslims would, on the one hand, strengthen its hands at international level 
to counter any accusation of minority intolerance; and on the other, would prevent the 
northern and eastern province Muslims who make more than one-third of the total Muslim 
population from falling into the Tamil camp; and that would mean hollowing the Tamil claim 
of a contiguous Tamil territory stretching from Jaffna in the north to Pottuvil in the east50.  
From the point of view of the Muslim elite the bitter division between the two major 
national political parties namely, the United National party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom 
party (SLFP) combined with the strategic strength of Muslim votes in a  number of electoral 
constituencies provided a golden opportunity for political bargaining51. Practically in every 
Sinhalese dominated parliament and in every ministerial cabinet since 1947, and whether 
the ruling party or parties were of rightist, centrist or leftist hue Muslims did win adequate 
representation, sometimes more than adequately, both in the House of Representatives as 
well as in the cabinet. The benefits that accrued to the community from this Sinhalese-
Muslim political marriage of convenience were considerable especially in the fields of 
education and culture52. The gains in education were so notable in quantity especially by 
way of an increased number of Muslim public schools and Muslim teacher training colleges, 
all operating on a religiously drawn calendar, Muslim teachers and Muslim school inspectors 
and directors, that they virtually transformed the popular image of the community from one 
of ‘business’ to one of ‘teachers’. On the cultural side, the instruction of Arabic and Islamic 
studies in Muslim public schools, allocation of exclusive hours for broadcasting and 
telecasting Muslim programs over national broadcasting and television services, special 
public holidays to mark Islamic festivals, extended hours of lunch-break for Muslim public 
servants on Fridays to attend the noon prayer and so on were unique privileges granted to 
Muslims of Sri Lanka53. In short, after independence and until the end of the 1970s through 
sheer politics of pragmatism the Muslim leaders without forming a political party of their 
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own were able to shepherd their flock peacefully and profitably in an environment of 
emerging ethnic tensions. This cosy atmosphere could not last long. 
Dirigisme and anti-Muslim violence 
To the greater part of the 1970s when the SLFP-United Left Front coalition was in power 
(1970-1977) dirigisme ruled the economy. Nationalisation of the strategic sectors of the 
economy, restrictions on private ownership of properties and state control over even small 
businesses thwarted private enterprise and limited economic freedom. The Muslim 
community that thrived on freedom to trade and private economic initiatives obviously did 
not view the new economic policies with favour.  In a state regulated economy Muslim 
businessmen were finding it particularly hard to obtain import-export licences, quotas and 
other facilities to conduct their own commercial ventures. The government controlled 
media gave maximum publicity to arrests, trials and convictions of merchants, businessmen 
and bureaucrats if they happened to be Muslims. Even in the implementation of the Land 
Reform Bills of 1972 and 1975 Muslim land owners and proprietors were treated 
particularly harshly by government agencies. In short, the coalition’s ideological drive to 
create a socialist economy and the adverse publicity given to the maleficence of a few 
Muslim businessmen and landed proprietors tarnished the public image of the so called 
‘business community’.  
 While on the one hand the socialist policies and programs of the SLFP-ULF Coalition 
adversely and rather disproportionately impacted the economic interests of Muslims the 
power and influence of the Muslim minister of education, Badiuddin Mahmud a founder 
member of the SLFP, created on the other considerable tensions within the cabinet which 
spilled over into a malicious anti-Badi campaign in the public. In the view of one historian 
the ministry of education under Mahmud “became at once a political base and a fountain of 
patronage, to be used to strengthen the ties between his community and the parry to which 
he belonged.”54   In fact his ministry virtually functioned as the employment exchange for 
Muslims. Posters and graffiti bearing anti-Muslim slogans appeared in various corners of the 
country after 1975. As a result of these developments there was a series of anti-Muslim 
violent incidents in various parts of the country culminating in the Puttalam riots of 197655. 
Researchers have recorded a total of 30 anti-Muslim violent incidents between 1976 and 
200356. 
The change of government in 1977 from SLFP to UNP under J.R. Jayewardena, the end of the 
socialist economic experiment, and the transformation of the Tamil issue from a peaceful, 
gradualist and parliamentary struggle under the conservative Federal Party leadership to a 
violent, radical and separatist conflict in the hands of a militant LTTE leadership arrested the 
spread of Muslim resentment somewhat, because once again Muslim support emerged 
crucial to the government’s preoccupation to fight against the LTTE. 
Open Economy and Anti-Muslim violence on a Different Front 
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The Jayewardena government heralded the era of open economy and a so called dharmista 
(righteous) society. The new economic policy was a boon to private entrepreneurs and 
businessmen, and once again the commercial traits of the Muslims were reinvigorated. The 
new president dreamed of transforming Sari Lanka into another Singapore with unfettered 
freedom for the market forces, foreign investment and profit motive. Unfortunately 
however, the ethnic issue took a turn to the worse and the Muslim community faced 
problems from a different front. Tamil violence against the Sinhalese, state assets and 
security forces became much more frequent and vicious after 1977, which provoked the July 
1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. With that the scene was set for a new bloody phase in Sinhalese-
Tamil ethnic confrontation. The LTTE led by a group of impatient Tamil youth, resorted to 
armed struggle not just to win back Tamil rights under a unitary or federal constitution but 
to achieve an independent Tamil state altogether called Tamil Eelam. In the civil war that 
ensued Muslims were caught in the cross fire. While one section of the community that 
lived in the Sinhalese districts fell under the protection of the Sinhalese army and security 
forces the other section, more than one-third, was trapped in the north and east and faced 
LTTE wrath. Because the Muslims refused to apportion their allegiance between the two 
rival camps those living in the north and east were suspected by the LTTE as fifth column 
and were constantly terrorized culminating in the eviction overnight of nearly seventy-five 
thousand Muslims from the north57. Hundreds more were killed by the LTTE in the east. In 
one incident one hundred and twenty-three Muslims in Kattankudy, an urban settlement six 
kilometres to the south of Batticaloa in the Eastern Province, were massacred in August 3 
1990 while they were at the evening prayers in a mosque58. According to one source nearly 
45,000 acres of paddy lands belonging to Muslims of the Eastern Province were forcibly 
taken over by the LTTE in one year alone, and the damage done to Muslim businesses in just 
two of the towns, Valaichenai and Mutur, in the same province was estimated to be closer 
to one billion rupees59.  In short, to the Muslims who lived in the Tamil districts the civil war 
years were a period of abject fear and unbearable horror. While the majority of Muslims in 
the east suffered, a minority who had the means migrated to the Sinhalese districts, 
especially to the capital Colombo.  
The anti-Muslim violence unleashed by the LTTE, the insouciance of Muslim 
parliamentarians in Colombo on the plight of their eastern brethren, and the new but 
complicated system of proportional representation introduced by the Jayewardena 
constitution of 1978 convinced a group of Muslim activists and political aspirants in the 
Eastern Province that without a separate political party for the Muslims the community’s 
survival in the country was in danger. The idea of such a party, the Sri Lankan Muslim 
Congress (SLMC), was mooted in 1981, was registered in 1986 and stood for parliamentary 
elections in 1989 under the leadership of M.H. M. Ashraff60 who was killed in 2000 in a 
helicopter crash believed to have been engineered by the LTTE.  With the formation of this 
SLMC on an ethnic and religious platform the Muslims inevitably entered the fray of 
organized ethnic politics, the curse of modern Sri Lanka.   
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Muslims under SLMC 
The establishment of the SLMC though preceded LTTE sponsored anti-Muslim violence 
certainly aggravated its intensity afterwards and did not bring, contrary to what its leaders 
and theoreticians trumpeted, any substantial changes to Muslim fortunes in the country. 
The political strategy of SLMC hinged on two objectives; to mobilise the majority of Muslim 
votes under its wing and to render support to any single party or coalition of parties aspiring 
to form a government on the basis of written agreement with specific demands benefiting 
Muslims61.  The first opportunity for such a political bargain arose after the general elections 
of 1994 when the two rivalling national parties, UNP and the Peoples’ Alliance (PA) did not 
win sufficient number of seats to form a government on their own. SLMC with its seven 
member bloc emerged as a formidable force in determining the final outcome. To its 
support the PA government under Chandrika Kumaratunga rewarded the SLMC leader 
Ashraff by appointing him as the Minster of Ports Development, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction. Like the Ministry of Education under the SLFP-ULF coalition this ministry 
under PA-SLMC coalition also became a “fountain of patronage” and source of employment 
at least for the Muslims of Sri Lanka’s southeast.   
The strategy of collective bargaining openly advocated by the SLMC went against the main 
tenor of the hitherto accepted politics of pragmatism where Muslim supporters of ruling 
parties struck an unwritten code of compromise in the interest of mutual benefit. The new 
departure created problems to the community on two fronts. On the one hand, while the 
LTTE looked upon the SLMC as the sole embodiment of Muslim resistance to its cause of 
Tamil Eelam sections of Sinhalese nationalists on the other viewed Ashraff’s avowed 
bargaining tactics and identity politics as threat to Sinhalese political dominance. While the 
LTTE went on a rampage against Muslims in the north and east anti-Muslim sentiments 
were whipped up some leading Buddhist monks in the rest of the country62.                    
Buddhist Militancy and anti-Muslim Violence   
After little over a quarter of a century of senseless mayhem the end of the civil war in 2009 
no doubt brought a huge sigh of relief to everyone in the country. However, contrary to 
grand expectations of peace, harmony and prosperity to all the post-war years have 
produced paramilitary groups and militant movements with fascist tendencies that threaten 
to deny peace any chance to pay dividend.  Triumphalism and euphoria rather than humility 
and magnanimity have coalesced to create an ultranationalist Buddhist faction, Bodhu Bala 
Sena (BBS), which is the foster child of another Buddhist chauvinist party Jatika Hela 
Urumaya (JHU), which in turn is one of the coalition members of the ruling United Peoples’ 
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) regime. BBS has a simplistic solution to solve the country’s 
problems and that is Buddhisization of the country, its economy and society. 
“Buddhisization of the “multiethnic, multireligious, multicultural, multilingual Sri Lanka … is 
not an opinion to be debated, but a fact to be faced”, says the Sinhalese human rights 
activist Seneviratne63. BBS’s manifesto echoes that of 969, an extremist organization in 
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Myanmar that is bent on ethnically cleansing the country of its 4 per cent Muslims64.  On the 
economic front BBS and JHU have not questioned the macroeconomic neo-liberal paradigm 
but have challenged the legitimacy of successful entrepreneurs were they happen to be 
members of ethnic minorities. In a nutshell, the ideology of BBS and JHU could be 
paraphrased as follows: Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country, Buddhism and Buddhist values are 
paramount, and minorities should either live as subordinate subjects or leave the country. 
According to this philosophy Muslims obviously are aliens and belong to Arabia, a sentiment 
expressed earlier by nationalist Buddhists on the eve of 1915 riots65. 
With the Tamil warriors militarily confronted and vanquished and their political wing 
marginalised Buddhist militancy has turned its attention towards the Muslims. Their alleged 
grievances against the Muslim community are both religious and economic. On the religious 
side the proliferation of mosques with foreign funds and presence of Muslim shrines in the 
country, calling for prayer over loudspeakers, slaughtering of cattle for sale and 
consumption, halal certification of food products and preaching of Islamic religious 
extremism are prominent issues66. On the economic front the export of Sinhalese female 
labour to the Middle East particularly as house maids, the emergence of Muslims as 
successful businessmen and entrepreneurs, Muslim possession of property in urban areas 
and a disproportionate increase in Muslim population (from 7.42 per cent to 9.23 per cent 
between 1989 estimate and 2011 census as against from 73.92 per cent to 74.88 per cent 
for Sinhalese for the same period) seem to be the major problems. Harping on these issues 
BBS has escalated its anti-Muslim propaganda and caused a series of violent incidents 
involving destruction of mosques and shrines, molesting Muslim women for wearing their 
cultural attire and throwing pig heads inside mosque premises. Independent observers have 
recorded a total of one hundred and three anti-Muslim violent incidents between January 
and March of 2013 alone67.            
Surprisingly the government has not taken any serious step so far to bring these incidents to 
a halt and rein in the anti-Muslim campaign of BBS. In the face of this escalating rage the 
powerlessness demonstrated by Muslim parliamentarians who are also like JHU a coalition 
partner of the regime has disappointed the Muslim population who have so far not reacted 
to any of BBS provocations.  The BBS-JHU-UPFA nexus has all the signs of leading Sri Lanka 
towards an unattainable mono-religious and mono-cultural totalitarian society. To the 
Muslims of course their cherished strategy of politics of pragmatism appears to have come 
to an end68.          
Conclusion 
From pre-colonial Serendib to colonial Ceylon and to post-colonial Sri Lanka the Muslim 
community has experienced vicissitudes of harmony and conflict. More than a millennium of 
peace and tranquillity enjoyed under the rule of Buddhist monarchs the community 
endured a period of oppression under the Portuguese and Dutch colonial masters before 
relishing a period of relative respectability and freedom under the British. The oppression 
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under the Portuguese and Dutch ultimately proved a blessing in disguise because it induced 
the Muslims to integrate with the Buddhist community and become indigenized. Although 
the 1915 riots was an unexpected shock to this healthy development the years following the 
mayhem healed the wounds and after Sri Lanka became independent an era of pragmatic 
politics allowed the Muslims to taste once again a period of harmony and prosperity. The 
open economy ushered in after 1977 with its neo-liberal macroeconomic policies and an 
outbreak of triumphalism after the defeat of the LTTE have created economic envy and 
religious phobia against the community. Plural Sri Lanka is bordering on the verge of 
descent, divisions and disharmony. A detailed diagnosis of this change is beyond the scope 
of this summary.            
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